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Sub-Saharan Africa Report

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ANGOLA

SUCCESSES, DIFFICULTIES IN ECONOMIC SITUATION REVIEWED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1891, 5 Feb 82 pp 339, 340

[Text] A characteristic feature of the economic situation in Angola is the sharp contrast between the prosperity of one sector, the expanding oil sector which has played a vital role in the economy of the country since its independence in 1975, and the decline or stagnation of most of the other sectors. Even at that, it is a question of nuances in both cases.

Up to the last year, the petroleum sector was thriving. It is less so today. The world economic crisis, the declining energy consumption by client countries due to the prices of crude oil increasing tenfold in the space of a few years, have created an oil glut in the world market. Like other producing countries, last year, Angola pumped less crude oil and sold it cheaper; at the beginning of 1981, the official asking price was \$38.75 per barrel; now, it has dropped to just over \$34 per barrel.

Since petroleum is the mainstay of the Angolan economic structure, the loss in earnings was important. The decline of oil revenues meant in practice that last year, for the first time since 1975, the balance of payments registered a deficit of about \$100 million.

The authorities in Luanda had counted on having total export revenues of about \$2 billion in 1981 (petroleum represents 80 percent of all exports) but earnings in foreign exchange were, in fact, almost \$600 million short of that figure. Yet government circles remain optimistic about the future of the petroleum sector where a production level of 15 million tons could be reached by 1985 according to seemingly realistic figures or 25 million tons according to figures which appear to be optimistic. In any case, this progress presupposes that Angola will increasingly resort to Western technology. Angola has obtained large loans from U.S. banks and its current efforts to normalize its relations with the United States are acknowledged.

In sectors other than petroleum, the situation is not very good for three different kinds of reasons, two of which are beyond the control of the government. First, we have the war effort which Angola must maintain against constant attacks from South Africa; there is every reason to believe that this situation will continue as long as the Namibian problem remains unresolved;

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military expenditures absorb between 30 and 50 percent of the national budget. There is also the fighting inside the country and more particularly the guerrilla operations carried out by the opposition movement UNITA in the central part of the country, operations which are more or less openly linked to the conflict between Angola and South Africa.

The consequences of this double conflict situation, as far as the Angolan economy is concerned, are many. Each day, Angola must staunch its wounds; it must rebuild and repair the damage caused by war or by acts of sabotage within its territory (among the sabotage, let us mention in particular, the damage inflicted on the Luanda petroleum refinery in November). Angola must also satisfy the needs, mostly in terms of food, of both the local populations and the refugees from the south, from Namibia; while its agricultural production comes mainly from the unsafe central part of the country and has been declining due to the impact of a big exodus from the rural areas (the population of Luanda, for instance, has climbed from 45,000 inhabitants in 1974 to 1.2 million at present). To compound the problem, the transportation of food supplies suffers from disruptions and disorganizations.

But the war situation does not explain everything and we come to the other reasons for Angola's economic difficulties. The public authorities have not always been capable of efficiently managing the country's potential resources. This is understandable in view of the fact that it is a newly established republic where its leaders "have experienced a lot of teething troubles" after the mass departures of the former colonizers and have had to learn by trial and error.

Several factors constitute drawbacks for the government and for the sector under it. Undoubtedly, the most significant one is the course followed in agricultural policy. In this sphere, the Marxist-Leninist state of Angola has failed as have all the other Marxist-Leninist countries of the world and, most of all, the most important of these countries, the Soviet Union, is still a long way from being able to grow enough food to feed its population.

The Angolan agricultural policy, which has resulted in food shortages and the subsequent thriving blackmarket, is based on setting up state farms without giving enough thought to motivating the farmers and marketing what they produce, in other words, to the question of paying them for what they grow. Under these circumstances, cash crops are no better than food crops; this is why the current coffee crop came to 21,000 tons while, before independence, it was 10 times higher. A "back to the land" drive is under study.

While in the agricultural sector there has been an initial error in the course taken, in other sectors it would be more accurate to speak of shortages. It is so for trade. First, there is the domestic trade sector where the bad distribution of foodstuffs and goods results in endless waiting lines outside the shops and practically empty markets; to get around this problem, they are now talking about encouraging small merchants by giving them tax breaks. Then, there is the foreign trade sector where practical steps, mainly involving a change of direction, have been taken to unclog the port of Luanda which is so badly run that it is costing the state \$5 million in payments to shipowners. A more

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centralized management of commercial exchanges is also being considered with the introduction of three requirements: a ministerial authorization before any contract is signed, a stricter control over imports and priority for cost efficient investments.

The last drawback explaining the economic problems of Angola is the lack of enough trained technical personnel; today, 60 percent of the vehicle fleet and 40 percent of the tractor fleet are idle for lack of qualified mechanics and repair shops. A decision has been made to remedy that situation.

We conclude this brief survey by quoting an Angolan official: "With better management and new discoveries of oilfields, we are going to improve the situation. But, first of all, there must be peace again."

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ANGOLA

BADEA LOAN GRANTED FOR FISHING PORTS IMPROVEMENTS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1893, 19 Feb 82 p 579

[Text] An agreement was signed in Khartoum between the National Bank of Angola, represented by its deputy governor, Jose Agostinho Neto and the Arab Bank for African Economic Development (BADEA), represented by Hassan Omar Ahmed, legal counsellor. According to the terms of this agreement, the BADEA is to grant Angola a \$10 million loan to finance a project to improve Angolan fishing ports.

This investment is a first step taken by Angola in its attempt to reorganize fishing activities in a long-term program. More specifically, the project is aimed at reinforcing the catch capacity of the fleet, as well as at rebuilding port and processing infrastructures. It will also contribute to the promotion of professional training.

This loan is repayable in 10 years, at the end of a grace period of 5 years and bears an annual interest rate of 6 percent. The Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development will also contribute to this project with a \$12 million loan. Total investments have been estimated at \$27.7 million and will take effect over a 4-year period beginning in 1982.

It should be noted that the BADEA loan is the second one to Angola. The first was related to an important railroad project. The country has so far benefited from various Arab investments, totaling about \$48.8 million (including the BADEA assistance).

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ANGOLA

BRIEFS

DELEGATION TO BRUSSELS--An Angolan delegation made up of planning and energy experts traveled to Brussels at the end of January in order to hold talks with EEC officials. Led by Florencio de Almeida, head of the Department of Western Nations in the Office of Secretary of State for Cooperation, the delegation's trip ties in with the visit which Edgard Pisani, European commissioner for development, is to make to Luanda in February. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1892, 12 Feb 82 p 413] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 11,464

COOPERATION WITH ITALY--The third meeting of the Italian-Angolan joint commission, which has just completed its work in Rome, has resulted in "a consolidation of economic ties between the two countries," according to a joint communique published on 27 January, which states that an important oil prospecting contract was concluded by the Italian government firm known as the ENI (National Hydrocarbons Agency). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1892, 12 Feb 82 p 413] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 11,464

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BURUNDI

BRIEFS

BUDGET FOR 1982--At the beginning of January, the finance minister of Burundi presented the Burundian state budget for 1982. That budget is set at 20.45 million Burundi francs, a 20 percent increase compared to 1982 [as published]. Operating expenditures represent 14.36 million Burundi francs (21.4 percent higher compared to the previous budget) and are distributed as follows: 8.82 billion (61.5 percent) for general services; 3.46 billion (24 percent) for social services; 2.06 billion (14.36 percent) for economic services. Expenditures on investments total 6.08 billion Burundi francs with 28 percent of this sum going to production, 28 percent to rural development, 38 percent to basic infrastructures and the balance to industries, communications and so on. In 1982, current revenues are budgeted at 13.2 billion Burundi francs deriving from taxes (5.2 billion), custom duties (6.8 billion) and from "administrative receipts" (close to 2 billion). Payroll expenses represent 53 percent of the total expenditures. This is due to the abolishment of free housing for civil servants which had led to granting housing allowances amounting to 27 percent of the budget. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1889, 22 Jan 82 p 209] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 8796

TANZANIAN BORDER TALKS--Following a visit to Burundi by a Tanzanian delegation led by Mr Nyanganyi, minister of lands, housing and urban development, a joint Tanzanian-Burundian communique, published on 9 January in Bujumbura, notes that, during the visit, the Tanzanian minister and accompanying delegation had talks with Lt Col Stanislas Mandi, Burundian minister of interior, on matters concerning the Tanzanian-Burundian border and had an opportunity to visit several development projects. Both parties reviewed the situation which has existed on their common border since the meeting held on 15 September 1981 in Kibondo (Tanzania) between the governor of Ruyigi and the regional commissioner of Kigoma and the meeting held on 21 October 1981 in Camazi (Burundi) between Burundian and Tanzanian experts. Both sides studied the Anglo-Belgian agreement establishing the boundary line between Burundi and Tanzania and accepted that agreement as the real point of reference in matters relating to the border between the two countries. Then they analyzed the conclusions reached at the Kibondo and Camazi meetings and, more specially, the question of matching maps of their common border area. Regarding the destroyed boundary markers, both sides have agreed to rebuild them as soon as possible and while their location is still easily ascertained. After this is done, the two delegations will meet again to update the addendum to the draft treaty setting out the commitments made by each country on the matter of protecting and respecting the boundary markers. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1889, 22 Jan 82 p 209] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 8796

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CAPE VERDE

BRIEFS

WATER PROJECT LOAN--The African Development Bank (ADB) group has granted Cape Verde loans totaling \$15 million to finance water projects for the town of Mindelo. The first project is a 4-year program to build a water distribution system and a sewage system. The project will take 4 years to complete and will cost \$8 million with the ADB providing \$7 million. The second project, with a total cost of \$10 billion of which \$8 million will come from the ADB, involves a 5-year program to improve the health services in Cape Verde and to increase its health personnel. These loans bring to a total of \$37 million the contributions of the ADB group to Cape Verde. Previous loans were for projects in the spheres of telecommunications, agricultural development, shipyards and economic studies. The loan agreements were signed on 28 January, in Praia, by Babakar Ndiaye, vice president of the ABD, and by Corentino Santos, governor of the National Bank of Cape Verde. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1891, 5 Feb 82 p 318] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982.] 8796

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

SITUATION DESCRIBED AS STILL FAR FROM STABILIZED

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 258, 1-14 Feb 82. pp 15-17

[Article by Mariam Sysle: "The Joys and Sorrows of the Military Committee for National Recovery"]

[Excerpts] To judge from its statements and also its initial actions, the Military Committee for National Recovery (CMRN) in power in Bangui since last 1 September lacks neither good will nor candor. If in his message of greeting to the nation on 31 December, the new chief of state, Gen Andre Kolingba, proclaimed his intention to make of 1982 a year of "real change" in national unity and concord, the measure, he believes, of a stability which "should assure the Central African Republic of the confidence of its sons and its friends," he does not promise imminent abundance. On the contrary, he announced a period of austerity. Which is not surprising when one realizes the situation of delapidation and recession in which more than 20 years of underhanded dealings have plunged the country's economy, and when one realizes also that the International Monetary Fund is not unfamiliar with the orientation of solutions and remedies planned in an attempt to correct this situation.

In a statement carried over radio and television on 1 November, the chief of state gave some indications, supported by figures, of the critical nature of the situation. The gross domestic product has dropped by five percent per year since 1977, he said, and there is every reason to fear that it will drop still more drastically in 1982. Since 1979, one worker out of five has lost his job. More than a third of the budget requires foreign aid support.

"This situation," stressed General Kolingba, "deals a serious blow to our dignity and threatens national independence and any recovery for our economy." Therefore the chief of state announced that austerity will prevail in the drafting of the next budgets for the Central African Republic and that public expenditures will be drastically curtailed. "There will be no increase in wages for government employees in 1982," he warned, and in the private sector, priority will be given to the creation of new jobs. Urging Central Africans to accept lasting sacrifices, Army Gen Andre Kolingba concluded: "It is only at the cost of substantial effort that we can hope to enjoy modest prosperity in a few years' time."

Shortly after its establishment, the CMRN established the main guidelines for reform in public life and the management of affairs of state. For example, it had decided to reduce military personnel from 5,000 to 4,000 by the end of 1981 and

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to undertake a simultaneous "pruning" of government employees, a sector in which the number of wage earners had doubled since 1966 (increasing from 11,650 on that date to 23,000 in 1981), absorbing two-thirds of the operational budget. The pensioning of a thousand individuals who had completed 27 years of service or whose incompetence was outstanding was to be made effective in January 1982.

Parallel with this, the CMNR made clear its desire to attack the evils of corruption and fraud. While a vast investigation of the customs administration personnel was launched, some 30 persons, charged with misuse of funds--including two bank directors and their authorized agents, as well as a former minister of national education, Nicolas Gotouas--were arrested in November. General Kolingba announced "extremely harsh" penalties for those found guilty of "violations" in the "management of public affairs."

Finally, in order to combat absenteeism and negligence, which had paralyzed the operations of public departments, disciplinary measures were planned. And setting the example by starting their workday at 7:30 in the morning, the military administrators urged the government employees to keep to the same schedule, something which no one can recall having ever seen before in Bangui.

Slight Improvement

All of this contributed to reducing tension, to relieving the atmosphere of insecurity and fear which had previously prevailed, and led to some upswing in industrial and trade activities. For example, since September, two Central African agencies representing French utility vehicle and light motor manufacturers saw respective increases in their sales of 50 and 10 percent in comparison to the same period in 1980. The only Central African manufacturer of shoes, whose sales had dropped 17 percent in the course of the first 8 months of 1981, saw an increase in turnover of 30 percent, which made the hiring of additional personnel necessary.

However this "slight improvement" is still extremely precarious, and it is much too soon to make any predictions. The task facing the new administrators is tremendous, in view of the situation of generalized bankruptcy and recession affecting all sectors.

A landlocked country, the Central African Republic is more of an enclave than ever. Except for a few hundred kilometers of asphalted roads, the road and track network, which has had no maintenance for 16 years, is in a regrettable, if not unusable, state. The result is that whole regions in the back country are cut off from the capital, and this is one of the reasons explaining why the rural inhabitants have reverted in some zones to a wholly subsistence economy.

The river network has seen a steady decline in recent years, and traffic in the port of Bangui dropped to 84,000 tons in 1979. If there are external causes for this development (the obstruction of the Congolese ports and the troubled situation in Chad, in particular), poor maintenance of the Bangui port and the handling equipment also contributed greatly to it.

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The main industrial crops, cotton and coffee, which along with tobacco supplied more than a third of the country's export income in 1980, dropped by substantial percentages. The cotton harvest, which had come to as much as 50,000 tons in 1970 and 1971, no longer exceeds 16,000 tons. The disinterest of the producers in a crop which brings them practically nothing and for which they receive no encouragement, as well as the low level of world prices, are the basic factors in this decline. The same is the case with coffee. A crop of which 40 percent of the harvest is stolen on the tree. Income from it had in the past, through the support fund created to launch the recovery of this crop, served to "finance" Bokassa's "folies," in particular a considerable proportion of the celebrations on his coronation. Coffee exports, which had reached 14,000 tons in 1978-1979, were not expected to exceed 7,500 tons in 1981.

As to diamonds, which continue to supply the state budget with the greater part of its foreign exchange income (8 billion CFA francs in 1980, i.e., more than a third of the total for exports), the official production--it is estimated that half the actual production is drained away by fraud--has dropped by half. Production fell from 400,000 carats in 1974 to 250,000 in 1980. The decline in prices which occurred in April 1981 was hardly likely to improve the situation, which had up to that point benefitted from an increase in prices.

The Financial Sinkhole

On the social level, as one can imagine, the situation is disastrous. Health structures are nonexistent or disrupted, with inevitably serious consequences in a country in which infectious and contagious diseases are still endemic. The overall mortality rate is estimated at 250 per thousand, and the infant mortality rate at 130 per thousand. There is approximately one physician for every 27,000 inhabitants and one hospital bed for every 800 (and it must be realized, in addition, that the distribution of health stations and personnel is, of course, uneven).

Approximately 90 percent of the population is illiterate, and the official school enrollment rate is about 47 percent. Of a faculty of 176 at the University of Bangui, with an enrollment of almost 2,200, 139 are foreigners, a reflection of a policy which tends to hinder the training and development of national cadres.

The population explosion and above all the rural exodus pose formidable problems (lodging, food) in the cities. While 80 percent of the population (totaling 2,334,000) draws its resources from agriculture, almost a quarter of the population (674,000 persons) is living in the urban centers today, with the capital alone accommodating 340,000.

The drop in exports, the decline in industrial production, and the squandering of resources by the former "Emperor" Bokassa, for which it is certain no total can ever be established (on the other hand, the credit established in accounts opened in Switzerland by the former dictator to accommodate the profits from his misappropriations of public funds, and which is currently being tapped by the family of the "prince regent," is estimated at 50 billion CFA francs), all of this led state finances to the bottom of the pit. The public debt of the state reached 62 billion CFA francs (i.e., almost 50 percent of the gross domestic product). The budget

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deficit, which reached a total of 8 billion CFA francs in 1980 (but which had at that time been almost entirely covered by a subsidy of 7 billion provided by France), was expected to reach 11 billion in 1981, while the contributions of the IMF and France for the same fiscal year were only 4 billion and 3 billion CFA francs, respectively. It is expected that the budget deficit may reach 14 billion CFA francs in 1982.

What can be done not only to prevent the economic apparatus and state services from seizing up definitively, but also to establish the foundations for reconstruction? The emergency plan for economic and social recovery drafted by the preceding regime (David Dacko), covering two years, was based on the estimate that 98 billion CFA francs would be needed for its implementation. And the General Assembly of the United Nations expressly acknowledged the needs of the Central African Republic in its 5 December 1980 resolution, which included an urgent appeal for bilateral or multilateral aid.

The CMRN, which seems to take its inspiration from the program of its predecessors, shows no lack for its part of ambitious undertakings, although its task is to deal with the most urgent things first and to address itself to the priorities sectors. Its concerns pertain to the improvement of the road and air transport infrastructures, and the development of the rural and social sectors.

Where agriculture is concerned, General Kolingba's government plans to mobilize the unemployed for the raising of food crops around the major cities and the development of livestock breeding. The purpose will be to guarantee adequate food supplies at moderate prices. In addition to the introduction of modern cultivation techniques, plans call for the extension of the areas devoted to export production.

Four production extension zones for cotton are to be developed between now and 1985. The cost of the investments required is estimated at 16 billion CFA francs.

The Nomination of Goumba

Other proposals include the development of regional airports and undertaking the construction or the repair of 1,800 kilometers of roadway between now and the end of 1983. Eighteen billion CFA francs will be needed, and for the time being, financing is only guaranteed for a quarter of this project.

In the trade and industrial sectors, plans call for encouraging the establishment of agropartoral "microindustries" throughout the country. Attention is also being focused on extending prospecting for mineral wealth and the organization of re-afforestation projects.

Pending a better understanding of the plans of the new leaders, financial experts estimate that, apart from the sums allocated with definite goals in view, a financial effort of 15 billion CFA francs per year over 5 consecutive years will be necessary to put the administration and the economy back on the track.

It is understandable that, under these conditions, given the impasse in which the country finds itself, one of the main concerns of the CMRN is to reassure its

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"friends," the suppliers of funds and possible investors. For this reason, Gen Andre Kolingba stated in his 1 November speech that "No threat of nationalization could be freely allowed in the Central African Republic." Also in this connection, the chief of state set forth, in his message of greeting, his determination to put an end to the "unstable" and "vacillating" aspect of a society troubled by "constant upsets," and he asserted his readiness to take responsibility for any act of violence, sedition or action contrary to the "profound aspirations" of the Central African people, which are "peace, stability, growth and work."

Without a doubt some things have already changed in the country. The appointment of Dr Abel Goumba, a professor of medicine and former World Health Organization official and president of the Ubangi People's Patriotic Front-Labor Party (FPO-PT)--who returned to his country for good, as he had said he would several months ago, after 17 years in exile--as rector of the University of Bangui is evidence of this. Indeed, one can say that to some extent Abel Goumba had a right to this post, because of his writings and his experience. The fact nonetheless remains, however, that this was an event which would have been inconceivable under the earlier regime.

The majority of the political parties have to date maintained a waiting posture, when they have not, as some have done, indicated their a priori prejudice in favor of the CMRN, while others do not exclude the possibility of possible collaboration, provided of course that they can learn more about the projects of the new regime.

Rumors and Agitation

The Ubangi People's Patriotic Front, for its part, continues to demand the release of six of its members who were arrested by the Dacko government after the 14 July 1981 bomb attack perpetrated by the Iddi Lala group, which has been separated from the FPO-PT since September 1980.

Behind the formal status quo created by the suspension of political activity, which has just been reconfirmed by a circular issued by the minister of interior, a certain level of agitation can be seen and many rumors are circulating. One party, the Central African People's Liberation Movement (MLPC), headed by Ange Patasse, a former minister and prime minister under Bokassa, several of the members of which were reported to have been arrested early in January, is making quite a fuss. After having demanded elections at the end of December--a suggestion which everyone in the old opposition sector rejected as an ill considered, if not demagogic proposal--and announcing coups d'etat which never took place, Ange Patasse, who has been more often abroad than in Bangui since 1 September 1981, recently announced that the Central African presidency should be his by right. He attempts to legitimize his claims on the basis of the results of the fixed elections in March of 1981, which he himself challenged, as did the other candidates opposed to Dacko, but which gave him 38 percent of the vote. The least one can say is that such an inconsistent and outrageous attitude hardly provides any favorable arguments to those who would like to see the dialogue promised by Gen Andre Kolingba between the CSM [Supreme Military Council] and other sectors of the nation launched as soon as possible, along with the establishment of the

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conditions which will make it possible to rehabilitate the multiparty system in the Central African Republic.

Poisonous Propaganda

Efforts to revive tribal tensions, as evidenced by an anonymous document announcing plans for the assassination of political leaders, including Abel Goumba and Henri Maidou, have also been seen, while, according to certain rumors, Bokassa is planning, with the aid of unspecified forces, to try to regain power in Bangui. However, in view of the way the former dictator oppressed his people, it is hard to see how such a hypothesis can have credibility.

If it is obvious that all of these "rumblings" are the evidences of psychological warfare and propaganda campaigns, it appears that, for the CMRN, it is a time for vigilance and austerity rather than dialogue.

Moreover, while precise commitments on the part of the new regime are yet to come and questions remain as to the freedom of action of the CMRN in relation to its predecessors, it is obvious that real change and recovery cannot be launched without the development of a national consensus concerning the vital goals.

As can be seen, the situation in the Central African Republic is still far from stabilized.

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

CIVIL SERVANTS' SALARIES REDUCED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1892, 12 Feb 82 p 402

[Text] The CMRN (Military Committee for National Recovery), in power in Bangui since September, has just adopted harsh measures in order to rectify the economic situation and the AFP recently wondered about the firmness of the support it could henceforth enjoy among the people.

The AFP noted that observers in Bangui particularly wondered about reactions that would be engendered by recent reductions in civil servants' salaries, which would range from 5 to 28 percent, based on the wage scale.

Some 24,000 persons are affected by the measure, adopted in order to reduce the budgetary deficit of over 8 billion CFA francs, when the 1982 budget does not exceed 30 billion in receipts.

The decision, which is very unpopular, is part of the conditions required by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in order to replenish the Central African treasury. Several delegations from the Fund have visited Bangui in the past 2 months and observers believe that in the face of the "good will" of the military regime, provisions will be rapidly made in its behalf. France, the Central African Republic's main economic partner, could also participate in the recovery effort undertaken by Central African leaders.

Moreover, the latter are stepping up their action in order to improve the Central African image. For example, customs took in 1.8 billion CFA francs in duties in December 1981. This figure constitutes a record in a sector habitually undermined by corruption.

The military constantly calls for a fight against the misappropriation of public monies, fraud, smuggling, embezzlement and encourage the resumption of the major types of agricultural production, especially cotton, the main budgetary resource.

It should be recalled that the freeing of prices, linked to the wage freeze, already caused discontent among the people of Bangui in 1981, at the end of the regime of President Dacko.

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

BRIEFS

IMPORTANT APPOINTMENTS--President Kolingba has appointed to high positions in important state and commercial companies several personalities who have exercised great influence on Central African political life during the past 5 years. Thus, Joseph Potolot, who was appointed director general of the Central African Social Security Office (OCSS), was in turn president of the Supreme Court, minister of foreign affairs (1975), and then deputy prime minister in charge of administrative questions until the fall of Emperor Bokassa in September, 1979. Gen Andre Dieudonne Maguale has been appointed director of the National Information Office (ONI). This army officer was minister of public works and urban planning before he was appointed second deputy prime minister in 1979. The new deputy director general of the French-Central African Tobacco Company (FCAT), Gabriel Dote-Badekara, is a technocrat. After serving as technical adviser to the Ministry of Agriculture for several years, he subsequently held a number of responsible posts within the Ministry of Rural Development. Dote-Badekara is a relative of Ange Patasse. Since Prof Abel Goumba, president of the Ubangi Patriotic Front-Labor Party, was appointed rector of the University of Bangui a few weeks ago, Dote-Badekara is the second opposition figure on whom President Kolingba has conferred a senior position in the administrative hierarchy. In Bangui observers consider the most recent decisions of President Kolingba as indicating a desire to open his government in the direction of those holding different "outlooks." This attitude perhaps will permit the evolution of the political situation in the Central African Republic, at a time when the economic situation remains a matter of concern and when the 1982 budget has been fixed at 38.2 billion CFA [African Financial Community] francs, with a provisional deficit of 8.2 billion CFA francs. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1891, 5 Feb 82 p 328] 5170

IRAQI COOPERATION--On 21 January in Baghdad, Iraq and the Central African Republic signed a cooperation agreement providing for the establishment of a mixed economic and commercial cooperation commission, according to the Iraqi News Agency (INA). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1891, 5 Feb 82 p 328] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982.] 5170

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CHAD

COUNCIL OF DEFENSE, SECURITY ESTABLISHED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1886, 1 Jan 82 p 33

[Text] On 26 December, it was reported in Ndjamea that the locality of Oum-Hadjer in Eastern Chad, approximately 150 kms from Abeche, had been captured by Hissein Habre's Northern Armed Forces [FAN]. Their capture of that locality, which is a strategic key point opening the road to the Natha district, has changed the military situation in the east of the country. That is the reason why the Zairian contingent, consisting of 1,000 men instead of 700 as originally planned, is reported to have been dispatched to Ati to reinforce the Nigerian contingent, instead of being deployed in Faya-Largeau as first intended. A Senegalese contingent may also be sent to Ati.

The advance of Hissein Habre's forces creates a serious problem for the mission entrusted to the OAU Pan-African force, and its commander-in-chief, Gen Geoffrey Ejiga of Nigeria, has declared that should the country's stability be threatened, the mission would have to be "stopped at once." According to Hissein Habre, the Pan-African force must do the groundwork to enable the Chadians to resolve their own problems through negotiations and in a communique of the FAN handed on 27 December to the AFP correspondent in Khartoum, he said that he was willing to start negotiations to find a peaceful solution to the Chadian conflict. Goukouni Weddei and the GUNT [Transitional National Union Government] are totally opposed to negotiations with Hissein Habre.

The Ndjamea Government is worried by the fall of Oum-Hadjer, and the Council of Ministers met on 25 December to review the military situation. The Council of Ministers also held a meeting the day before and decided to establish a "Council of Defense and Security," the basic function of which will be to "soundly" manage the free military aid given to Chad by several countries and to exercise control over all the armed forces, integrating them into the National Army. As a result of this, some observers believe that it could supervise all military operations and have more authority than the Staff General of the Integrated National Army, which was created at the end of May 1981 when the army factions were officially eliminated, although these still haven't been brought under effective control. The Integrated National Army is under the command of Lt Col Allafi N'Golobaye.

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CHAD

FRANCE SAID TO CONSIDER INTER-AFRICAN FORCES ROLE AMBIGUOUS

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 258, 1-14 Feb 82 P 14

[Article by Antonia Blis: "The Challenge of the Northern Armed Forces"]

[Excerpts] The imbroglio in Chad is becoming a little more complicated with every passing day. Speculation is rife, all or almost all of it tending, as if by chance to regard the return of Hissein Habre and his troops to Ndjamena. And with the prospect of intensification of the civil war or the arrangement of a compromise as insecure and dangerous as that which prevailed at the Lagos conference in August of 1979.

Interference and Confusion

In the midst of all of these maneuvers, the field of action available to the Transitional National Union Government (GUNT) headed by Goukouni Oueddei, is shrinking steadily. And interference, in the form of a generous flow of suggestions and advice from a group of nations claiming to act on behalf of the OAU, never ceases to multiply, adding to the confusion. It would appear as if no lesson had been learned from the dramatic events of 1980 and their outcome, and above all, as if the "major swing" which occurred during the last OAU summit meeting in Nairobi, where the new situation created in Chad by the defeat of Hissein Habre's dissident forces was finally acknowledged and the full sovereignty of the GUNT finally accepted, had never occurred.

Following the 4-day visit paid to Khartoum by a large delegation from Chad headed by Goukouni Oueddei last 12 January, optimism gained the upper hand. It appeared, if one adhered to a literal interpretation, that the negotiations might prove fruitful. In fact, Sudan, which had until then supplied Hissein Habre's Northern Armed Forces (SAN) not only with weapons and ammunition, but with soldiers as well, and which allowed a part of its territory to serve as a sanctuary for these forces, undertook to guarantee its "total support of the government and the people of Chad under the leadership of Goukouni Oueddei." On top of that, it gave it explicit guarantee that it would not contribute "aid to any force acting against the government in Chad, specifically the Northern Armed Forces."

The Sudan promised to use its good offices to assist the GUNT to implement the general amnesty decreed last July for the FAN, with the exception of Hissein Habre, who was sentenced to death in absentia, and several of his lieutenants.

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In short, an idyll developed between Khartoum and Goukouni Oueddei's GUNT which would make it possible for the coalition in power in Ndjama to win back the initiative and to move to the offensive in order to win back the ground lost to the forces of Hissein Habre. Since the withdrawal of the Libyan troops, in fact, the FAN, breaking all their promises, have not ceased to advance in the east, the center and now the northern part of the country, with the complicity, passive for the most part, of the "inter-African force."

A Lie and a Deception

But how could one fail to see that the rapprochement between Ndjama and Khartoum looks very much like a deceptive trap? In fact, can the promises of Sudan to put an end to the support it was giving their dissident forces of Hissein Habre be taken literally? The troops of the former GUNT minister of defense, powerfully equipped and said to be 4,000 to 5,000 men strong, have in fact already gained control of numerous strategic sites. And last 31 December, President Numayri again urged a "real national reconciliation" between Goukouni and Habre "under the umbrella of the OAU." Why would he have changed his tact to such an extent in so short a time?

In reality, the goals of all of those who are making as if to fly to the aid of Goukouni's GUNT today under OAU sponsorship are becoming ever clearer. Additional proof has just been supplied by the statements made by Nigerian Minister of External Affairs Ishaya Audu, following his talk in Nairobi on 16 January with Daniel arap Moi, the king and chief of state and acting president of the OAU.

The Jaws of the Trap

According to Ishaya Audu, the first phase of the mission of the inter-African peace force in Chad was completed "satisfactorily." One would think that he meant by that that the task of that inter-African force was to promote the return of Hissein Habre to the military terrain and the political scene in Chad pure and simple. But that is not all. "Efforts must still be made, particularly where the political problems in Chad are concerned," Ishaya Audu added, going on to explain that "The present government is a national transition union, and the OAU should help to set up a government freely elected by the people of Chad themselves."

To speak the truth, it does indeed seem that the nations who have set foot in Chad under OAU sponsorship are seeking to dictate the settlement of that country's affairs. And one might note that the resurgence of the arguments which were current when the whole of the OAU, with very few exceptions, backed the France of Giscard d'Estaing in supporting the candidacy of Hissein Habre for the presidency of Chad on the pretext of combatting Libyan "penetration."

Is the new French government caught in the jaws of the Chadian trap to the point that it has no other policy than to follow the course of events as a group of African nations want them to develop? Can it not or does it not want to go farther in its support of the GUNT--which it encouraged, moreover, to demand the withdrawal of Libyan forces--than political alignment with the OAU position? Which, as summarized by the minister of cooperation and development last 15 January, includes among its principles "absolute support of the decisions of the OAU,

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military nonintervention, support of every effort to achieve a political solution and pursuit of civil cooperation." Will Paris content itself with noting that the "ambiguity" where the role of the inter-African force is concerned has not been "completely dissipated?" In view of the development of the situation on the territory of Chad, the word "ambiguity" appears to be no more than an elegant euphemism.

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CHAD

BRIEFS

WFP FOOD AID--The World Food Program (WFP) has agreed to provide Chad with emergency aid valued at \$7 million to meet the shortages in foodstuffs following the civil war and the consequences of the catastrophic drought affecting the country; this indicated by the WFP in a communique published at the end of January. The aid will be made up of 15,000 tons of grains which, according to the WFP, will make it possible to feed 375,000 people for 100 days. According to the communique, the grain shortage in Chad for the 1981-82 crop year is estimated at 143,000 tons, or about double the chronic shortage recorded in the course of the preceding years. In view of this situation the WFP considers that emergency aid must be maintained at a high level until the harvest next November. We recall that the WFP already provided Chad with food aid valued at \$5.7 million last July and September. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1891, 5 Feb 82 p 328] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982.] 5170

YUGOSLAV, ROMANIAN COOPERATION OFFERS--Following a trip to Romania and Yugoslavia by Minister of Health Garadoun Monn-Djasngar, and a trip to Japan by Minister of Public Works Facho Balaam, the Chadian Council of Ministers has issued a communique saying that these three countries had "indicated their willingness to cooperate with Chad." A shipment of drugs and clothing will be arriving "very shortly in Ndjamena" as emergency aid from Yugoslavia, a country which is reported to have expressed its desire to open an embassy in Chad. The communique also states that Belgrade and Bucharest had promised the envoy of the GUNT [Transitional National Union Government] to intercede with "countries which provide aid and assistance for the rebellion so that they put a stop to it." Finally, official sources in Ndjamena have said that a Romanian mission is coming to Chad in the second half of January. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1886, 1 Jan 82 p 33] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 8796

EDF AID--The European Development Fund (EDF) will devote 7,796,000 ecus to financing for the program of priority action in Chad in different fields (live-stock raising, roads, social sector, and so on). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1892, 12 Feb 82 p 402] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 11,464

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CONGO

PRIME MINISTER GIVES BROAD OUTLINES OF 5-YEAR PLAN

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1886, 1 Jan 82 pp 34, 35

[Text] In our issue of 11 December 1981 (p 3314), we briefly mentioned that the Congolese prime minister, Col Louis Sylvain-Goma, had presented the 1982-1986 5-Year Plan for the Congo to the People's National Assembly. The plan, with proposed investments amounting to 1,105 billion CFA francs, was adopted on 24 December 1981 by the assembly. In his closing speech, Col Denis Sassou-Nguesso, the head of state, described as "a historic act" the adoption of this 5-year plan launched by "an undeveloped country with vast needs."

The prime minister, for his part, gave some specific details on the plan, the main points of which we are reporting here.

"The 1982-1986 5-Year Plan is basically centered on two pivotal points: 1) initiating the infrastructures needed to establish control over our lands, to bring a new balance and development to our national territory; 2) getting the state sector back on a sound footing. These two important strategic points mean in practice large capital investment programs as well as programs to reorganize the production machinery and get it rolling.

"The 5-year plan also includes social and cultural programs as well as programs aimed at strengthening the state apparatus. (...) The total financial package for the plan amounts to 1,105 billion CFA francs at their constant 1981 value, with 780 billion provided by the state and 325 billion by public or mixed enterprises, either out of their own funds or through loans."

Sectoral and regional programs fall under four categories: capital investment and infrastructural programs accounting for 48 percent of the planned outlays; programs connected with the production machinery (36 percent); programs of social and cultural investments (8 percent); investment programs relating to the state apparatus (8 percent).

Infrastructures

The biggest allocations (531 billion CFA francs) will be for infrastructures. This outlay pursues the following objectives: to build the most urgently needed road links between distant points, putting an end to the isolation of some areas; to start building major road links between the regions; to cover the cost of repair and maintenance for the entire road system; to study and reorganize the air transport infrastructures; to modernize the CFCO (Congo-Ocean Railroad) with a view to boosting its

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carrying capacity; to increase the number of port and river infrastructures and modernize the ATC (Trans-Congolese Communications Agency); to adapt the port of Pointe-Noire for a sea traffic which is expected to undergo rapid growth; to interconnect the electric network; to bring electricity, generated by hydroelectric and thermal power plants, to all urban and rural centers; to conduct studies and implement projects aimed at drastically increasing the installed capacity of hydroelectric power plants; to extend the multi-channel radio links; to make postal and telephone services generally available; to modernize radio and television; to improve urban living conditions and create urban facilities; to build storage centers all over the country for farm products, for basic commodities and for construction materials.

Implementation of this program during the years of the plan should solve most of the regional problems. With 531 billion CFA francs being allocated to the infrastructures, they play a vital role in the strategy of the 5-year plan. The state will directly contribute 433 billion while the enterprises will provide 98 billion either out of their own funds or from loans.

These 531 billion CFA francs are distributed as follows (figures in billions): transportation and civil aviation, 138.775; public works, 182.16; information and ONPT [National Postal and Telecommunications Office] (posts and telecommunications), 36.23; commerce, 20.33; tourism and environment, 11.9; energy and water supply, 117.1; urban infrastructures, 24.1.

Production Machinery

A total of 400 billion CFA francs, representing 36 percent of all the projects included in the plan, will be allocated to the production machinery. The main purpose of these investments in the production machinery is to get it back on the right track; this recovery plan actually represents 21 percent of total investments and 47.5 percent of state investments.

In the sphere of agriculture and livestock, the long-term objectives are to meet the country's food needs, increase exports, provide supplies for the agro-industries, while reducing unemployment and improving the living standards of the farming populations. According to the plan, 73.5 billion CFA francs will be invested in agriculture and livestock including 25 billion for the farmers. Also, close to 35 billion CFA francs have been budgeted to make improvements in the state farms.

The large investments allocated to water supply and forestry--194.8 billion CFA francs--will go to two specific types of projects: a paper pulp complex in Pointe-Noire with an estimated cost of 118 billion CFA francs, and forestry estates in the Sangha and Likouala regions.

Nearly 15 billion are allocated to mining and 103 billion to industry and fishing.

Social and Cultural Programs

"Improving the living conditions of the population," said the prime minister, "continues to be one of the constant concerns of the party and the state. Yet, one must be aware of the fact that any improvement of the living conditions is basically determined by the results obtained in the economic development."

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Nearly 86 billion CFA francs have already been assigned to social and socio-cultural programs. Most of the 86 billion will be distributed among the following sectors: national education, 22.65 billion of which 9 billion will be for the university, 5 billion for building new schools, 1 billion for basic training, 7 billion for improving the education system; health and social affairs, 28 billion; subsidized housing, 15.9 billion; youth and sports, 4.2 billion; and 8.82 billion will be used for the first group of 157 village centers chosen from all over the country."

Regional Programs

"A really vast investment effort, without precedent in the history of our country, will take place at the regional level during the 5-year plan period," Colonel Sylvain-Goma said. "More than 62 percent of all the investments, or some 600 billion CFA francs, will be assigned to projects directly connected with the regions as part of an effort to eliminate all disparities throughout the national territory. Infrastructures offering advantages on a regional and national level, the electrification of towns located in the interior of the country, road and sanitation projects in minor towns, capital investments involving transport, commerce and fuel distribution in the regions and finally roads--all this involves outlays of nearly 270 billion CFA francs. An additional 50 billion CFA francs will be used to improve the quality of life in the regions in the form of health care facilities, drinking water supply, housing, education, youth, sport and cultural projects. Finally, over 260 billion CFA francs will be invested in profit-generating projects in the spheres of agriculture, industry, fishing, mining, water and forest resources, and these projects will be located somewhere other than in Brazzaville and Pointe-Noire.

We can say that the plan was drafted in accordance with one of the main concerns voiced during the Third Special Party Congress: to bring the regions out of their isolation and to encourage regional economic development; to create a fair balance between the towns and the rural areas; to boost rural activities. But the willingness to effect a decentralization means in practice a large-scale regionalization of the tools of development even more than the allocation of heavy investments.

In addition to the ordinary operating budgets assigned to the local government, several new financial resources will be available to the regions. Here is a list of these resources: a Regional Action Fund of 3 billion CFA francs to promote the creation of crafts and industrial enterprises in the regions and, more generally, to support all regional or local economic projects; another 3 billion CFA francs assigned to build public housing in the regions; 1 billion CFA francs to support local agricultural and livestock projects; a Regional Development Fund of 3 billion CFA francs will be established to give assistance to enterprises affected by operating overcosts due to their unfavorable location. Finally, the administration of the state's investment budget must be partly decentralized."

Effects of the Plan

The prime minister also said that "if these programs are implemented without delay, our national economy will rapidly take off and show an average annual growth rate of 10 percent during the plan period. As for jobs, some 55,000 new ones will be created during the period covered by the plan. Finally, there will be an unquestionable improvement in the living conditions of the general population after the housing program is carried out, health care is made more accessible and projects involving educational facilities and the supply of water and electricity are implemented.

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"Although the plan rightly raises great hopes, from a realistic viewpoint one must also be aware that its execution could be hindered by impediments of a physical, technical, administrative and organizational nature. These restraints are, in particular, the limited means of transportation, logistic and organizational problems in the sphere of supplies, the lack of adequate skills in the work force, the weakness of our national achievement capabilities.

There is a danger that our external balance will seriously deteriorate under the impact of a fast economic growth largely based on imports of capital goods, of semi-manufactures for our production sector and additional consumer goods as the family's earnings increase. We must also be careful not to allow the public debt to increase excessively under the double effect of worldwide higher interest rates and the more widespread use of external financing.

For all these reasons, the government has deemed it absolutely necessary to back up the programs of the plan with a package of accompanying measures the main purpose of which is to constantly keep the plan on the right course, to control any imbalance and to institute strict financial procedures.

The first group of measures, involving the guidance and control of the plan, sets out to establish a planning method capable of dealing in a satisfactory manner with the uncertainties of the future. A Permanent Plan Evaluation Commission will be created and it will have the task of examining, modifying, and approving documents involving the evaluation, control and revision of the plan.

The second set of measures deals with the decentralization drive. Some of the measures have already been mentioned, others were included in various sectoral programs. However, it seems advisable to compile them in a single and consistent document to make them easier to understand, to assess their scope, and to set up the means of monitoring them. The administrative instruments required for the regional operations will be reinforced mainly by setting up regional labor offices which are absolutely necessary in order to have sound personnel management, by creating regional planning offices, by introducing measures to encourage the decentralization of the banking circuits and so on. The investment budget will be gradually managed at a regional level and this will be substantiated with investments allocated several times a year in amounts determined on a case-by-case basis. Civil servants assigned to the regions will be given a bonus. Finally, the way in which these decentralization measures are implemented will be periodically monitored during the plan period.

The third group of measures, concerning the financial commitments undertaken by the state, sets out to redefine the procedure applied to market transfers and loan subscriptions.

The fourth set of measures involves some legislation changes which will be introduced step by step over a certain period of time.

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CONGO

BRIEFS

FRENCH SUGAR LOAN--A loan of CFA 3.6 billion (Fr 72 million) was granted to the Congolese government at the end of January by the French Central Fund for Economic Cooperation (CCCE) for renovation of the Congo Sugar Company (SUCO), installed at Nkayi, it is announced by the CONGOLESE INFORMATION AGENCY (ACI). The amount of this loan will cover 35 percent of an investment program designed to enable SUCO to reach production of 70,000 tons of raw sugar per year in 1986. The loan agreement was signed in Brazzaville on 27 January by the minister delegated to the presidency in charge of cooperation, for the Congo, and by Pierre Melesse, director for the Congo, for the CCCE. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1891, 5 Feb 82 p 330] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 11267

AGREEMENT REGARDING PETROLEUM COMPANY--An establishment agreement in the amount of CFA 2.282 billion has been signed in Brazzaville between the Congo and the Bouygues Off-Shore Congo company, whose headquarters is in Pointe-Noire, it is announced by the CONGOLESE INFORMATION AGENCY (ACI). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1891, 5 Feb 82 p 331] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 11267

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EQUATORIAL GUINEA

BRIEFS

RDLGE REQUESTS RECOGNITION--The Democratic Assembly for the Liberation of Equatorial Guinea (RDLGE) has asked to be legally recognized by the military junta now in power in Malabo, according to a communique issued to the press in Dakar on 27 January. In the communique the president of the RDLGE, Manuel Ruben Ndongo, states that the request takes place in the framework of the preparations for free and general elections, whose implementation has been provided for by the military junta in the course of this year. In this context the RDLGE wishes to contribute to the work of construction of democracy and to play within that effort "an understanding role." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1891, 5 Feb 82 p 328] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982.] 5170

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ETHIOPIA

BRIEFS

MARIAM RECEIVES CONGOLESE MINISTER--Addis Ababa, 6 Mar (REUTER)--Ethiopian leader Mengistu Haile Mariam today received visiting Congolese Foreign Minister Pierre Nze at his Asmara palace--dispelling claims by Eritrean secessionists that he was wounded in Eritrea earlier this week. The Congolese minister came to Ethiopia last week to attend the Organisation of African Unity Ministerial Council in Addis Ababa. He stayed on for talks on strengthening relations between the two countries, officials said. During today's meeting in Asmara, Mr Nze presented a message from Congolese President Denis Sassou-Nguesso. An official of the Ethiopian News Agency (ENA) today described the secessionist claims as a sign of desperation. "They are trying to mislead world opinion in a desperate attempt to hide their own imminent demise," he said. A recent Ethiopian television commentary said there were no secessionist groups near Asmara. Those remaining in other areas were being pursued by the Second Liberation Army through mountainous country near the Sudan border. [Text] [JN062106 London REUTERS in English 2055 GMT 6 Mar 82]

NO COMMENT ON ERITREAN STATEMENT--There was no official comment on the EPLF statement in Addis Ababa, where the authorities have kept silent on the guerrillas claims to have scored major military successes in recent weeks. Western diplomatic sources in Addis Ababa said the Ethiopian Army has suffered several thousand casualties since launching a tank-backed campaign to smash the Eritrean secessionist movement earlier this year. The sources said the Ethiopian Government had sent up to 14,000 troops to northern Ethiopia under what is officially called the "Red Star Development Campaign." The Ethiopian media have said the aim of the campaign is to rehabilitate the area after 20 years of secessionist warfare. Last week, the official Ethiopian News Agency reported that victory for the government was near. But diplomatic sources in Addis Ababa and Nairobi recalled many similar statements in the past and described the prediction as premature. [Text] [JN051043 London REUTERS in English 1617 GMT 15 Mar 82]

ERITREAN GUERRILLAS REPORT LOSSES--Beirut, 15 Mar (REUTER)--Eritrean secessionist guerrillas said today they have killed 530 Ethiopian soldiers and wounded 700 in fighting over the last four days. The Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF), the largest of the guerrilla groups fighting the Ethiopian Government for the independence of Eritrea, said in a communique issued in Beirut that the fighting was around the northern town of Nakfa and on the north-east coast of the Red Sea province. Nakfa was the only town left in guerrilla hands after government troops drove them out of Asmara, the provincial capital [words indistinct] a new offensive to wipe out the secessionist movement and at the same time has undertaken to develop the province economically. The communique did not report Eritrean losses. [Text] [JN151640 London REUTERS in English 1031 GMT 5 Mar 82]

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GABON

WAGE NEGOTIATIONS, WORKERS DEMANDS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1891, 5 Feb 82 p 329

[Article: "Wage Negotiations and Movements for Union Demands"]

[Text] Following the decision by the Gabonese Council of Ministers on 15 January to raise the interoccupational guaranteed minimum wage in Gabon to CFA 35,000 and the supplementary allowance to CFA 15,000 (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS of 22 January 1982, p 206), Prime Minister Leon Mebiame decided, at a cabinet meeting on 23 January, that wage negotiations would take place throughout the entire territory starting on 25 January. These negotiations should relate to the general rise in pay, but also to "all the other problems" posed in the enterprises.

Negotiations did indeed take place at the end of January between the COSYGA (Gabonese Trade Union Confederation), the single trade union, the CPG (Confederation of Gabonese Employers) and the corresponding committees of the Ministry of Labor. The demands, though, often went beyond this framework. Various movements, strikes, were noted, especially in Port-Gentil, the economic capital of Gabon, and even in Libreville. The agreements negotiated by the representatives of the personnel were even challenged sometimes by the "rank and file," and the negotiations were especially delicate in the oil sector: the strikes began in ELF [Gasoline and Lubricants Company of France]-Gabon and spread even to the subcontractors. Whereas the situation seemed to be settled at the end of January, Port-Gentil's biggest enterprise, in terms of personnel (more than 2,000 workers), the CFG (Gabonese Forestry Company), which does rotary-cutting and veneers, went out on strike on 1 February.

The workers' main demands were pay-related, the increase in the cost of living in Gabon having made the situation of the lowest-paid workers difficult.

In some cases, the pay demands were for as much as a 100-percent increase. On the average, increases of 30 percent were granted in all sectors.

According to the information available to us at press time, the increases in the commercial sector were from 13 to 15 percent, depending on the category; and in oil, 50 percent for the laborers and 30 percent for the technicians. Among certain oil subcontractors, though, an 80-percent increase is reported to have been granted, which is 100 percent over mid-1981, because of a 20-percent increase 2 months ago. In the mines, the pay of the supervisory personnel increased less than that of the workers, and the increase is on the same order as in the oil sector.

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On the other hand, the president of the republic decided at the end of January to create, within the framework of the Ministry of National Education, a commission assigned the task of improving the working conditions of the teachers in Gabon. However, the civil service has not so far been concerned in the negotiations on pay increases.

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GABON

BRIEFS

SOLAR ENERGY EXPERIMENTS--In order to improve working conditions for personnel and the safety of users, the Beacon and Lighting Department, a division of the Gabon Ports and Roadsteads Office (OPRAG), has conducted experiments on the Ile des Perroquets, opposite the new port of Owendo and the Libreville port-breakwater in the heart of the Gabonese estuary, with solar energy for beacons in its channels. There is an average of 3 to 4 hours of sunlight a day in Libreville and OPRAG estimates that the solar solution (photovoltaic conversion) was more advantageous for its beacons than the old system that used gas. In addition, an agreement involving an equipment program using solar energy for four Gabonese villages was signed between the American and Gabonese governments on 4 February in Libreville. The program costs a total of \$1.6 million, about 480 million CFA francs. Out of this total, the American portion is \$500,000 (150 million CFA francs) and the Gabonese Government will pay the remainder. The program will be carried out in the field by specialists from the Lewis Research Center (Ohio) near Cleveland, a unit under NASA. The villages chosen are Bolossoville (Woleu-Ntem), Bogandji-Ondia (Upper Ogooue), Nyali (Nyanga) and Donguila (Estuary). The choice of these settlements in 1980 was confirmed in agreement with the Gabonese minister of mines and petroleum, second deputy prime minister, Etienne-Guy Mouvagha-Tchioba. Lighting by solar energy will make it possible to meet essential needs (clinics, schools, social, street lights, distribution of water by artesian wells and electric pumps). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1892, 12 Feb 82 p 403] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 11,464

SEEG PROJECTS--Back from a 2-week visit to the interior of Gabon, Andre-Paul Apandina, general manager of SEEG (Gabon Power and Water Company), said, in an interview with the Libreville daily L'UNION on 28 January: "A great deal remains to be done in the interior. We must have extensions in 17 places, while 5 others, already supplied with electricity, must have water. In addition, we have named 20 areas where neither water nor electricity is found. Consequently, a vast program to equip these areas is being studied. However, electrification and water supply projects are underway at Mayumba, Cocobeach and Omboue. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1892, 12 Feb 82 p 403] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 11,464

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SEEG'S PRODUCTION INCREASES--SEEG [Gabon Power and Water Company]: Growth in 1981-- At a meeting in Libreville at the beginning of January, it was announced that for the SEEG, the year just ended "was marked, as were the preceding years, by sharp growth." This growth is characterized by an increase in production of water and of electricity of 11.7 and 9.6 percent, respectively. The personnel of the SEEG also increased considerably, reaching a total of 1,650 Gabonese employees and expatriates. Turnover increased by 20.4 percent, going from CFA 16.74 billion in 1980 to CFA 20.16 billion, before taxes, in 1981. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1891, 5 Feb 82 p 330] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982]

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BRAZILIAN RAIL CARS RECEIVED--The Trans-Gabonese Railroad Office (OCTRA) has just received 41 rail cars from Brazil: 11 low-sided flatcars and 30 cars with sliding sides designed for transport of perishable commodities. These cars were made in Brazil by COBRASMA [expansion unknown]. These 41 new rail cars join the 449 cars that OCTRA already has: 15 passenger cars, 362 freight cars and 15 service cars, most of them from Japan, as well as from Algeria, Romania, France and South Korea. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1891, 5 Feb 82 p 330] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 11267

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GHANA

FOREIGN DEBT RISES, ECONOMIC MEASURES STILL AWAITED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1892, 12 Feb 82 p 395

[Excerpts] Over a month after the coup d'etat that brought him to power, Captain Rawlings had not yet been successful, by the beginning of February, in drawing up economic and financial measures aimed at correcting the country's situation.

Nevertheless, certain isolated moves seem to have been made.

The decision made on 6 February concerning the deposit in banks and post offices of all 50-cedi bills, in exchange for a receipt, pointed to an important monetary reform. The 50-cedi note, the largest bill used in the country, should therefore cease having any legal value effective 12 February. The measure was preceded by the temporary closing, on 4 February, of all banks and, on the following day, of most businesses. It should be noted that these measures were set forth before the post of secretary of state (minister) for finance and economic planning was filled. Also vacant was the post of natural resources, labor and health (see the makeup of the government in MARCHES TROPICAUX, 29 January, p 262).

The monetary measure recalled the recommendation made by the IMF to the former regime of President Limann that the currency be devalued by 500 percent.

It should be noted in general that the country is gradually taking the revolutionary path chosen by the captain, but this is not done without some reticence, even within the army.

Therefore, many people wonder about the future of the new regime and at the same time, note an obvious loss of freedoms and a deterioration in the situation. In both Ghanaian and foreign business circles, people even wonder whether all economic activity will soon be paralyzed.

Finally, a very harsh audit of the citizenry has been instituted in order to ascertain their property and income. Denunciations of excessive income are not only authorized, but recommended.

Foreign Debt

In its annual report for 1980-1981, the Bank of Ghana evaluated the country's general foreign debt at some \$1.5 billion, or twice the total amount of expected

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exports in 1981. The rate of inflation is 140 percent. These data are even more catastrophic than those announced in our 8 January issue on the occasion of the takeover by Captain Rawlings.

In addition, the Bank of Ghana also notes that at the end of June 1981, foreign exchange amounted to 126 million cedis, or, at the official exchange rate at that time, \$45.8 million. However, it was estimated that a tenth of that sum actually served to supply the flourishing black market for capital.

In addition, in the light of this disastrous situation, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) offered the previous civilian government of Dr Limann an aid program for \$1.4 billion stretched out over 4 years, but on the condition that the country get itself back on the path to economic recovery and that it devalue its currency. We know that the authorities at that time were opposed to the recommendation, deeming it to be harmful to the standard of living of the population, whose impatience could begin to become dangerous.

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GUINEA

BRIEFS

RESUMPTION OF ABIDJAN-CONAKRY FLIGHTS--Air Guinee flights between Abidjan and Conakry, which had been suspended for several years, just resumed on a weekly basis. Organization of the flights has been entrusted to Air Ivoire, in keeping with an agreement made on 8 February by the two companies. Resumption of the air connection between the two capitals fits into the framework of "strengthening cooperation existing between the two brother countries." It is believed in the Ivorian capital that at a time when Africa hopes to promote the expansion of its tourism, the opening of such a line between the Ivory Coast and Guinea will result in a tourist boom between the two. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1892, 12 Feb 82 p 390] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 11,464

FRENCH COOPERATION AGREEMENT--The JOURNAL OFFICIEL (5 February 1982) has published Decree No 82-129 of 27 January 1982, concerning publication of the cultural, scientific and technical cooperation agreement between the government of the French Republic and the government of the People's Revolutionary Republic of Guinea and the joint protocol establishing the organization of French personnel which France makes available to Guinea according to the terms of the agreement, signed in Paris on 26 June 1979 and in effect beginning on 24 October 1981. Several agreements were signed in June 1979 between France and Guinea (see MARCHES TROPICAUX of 29 June 1979, p 1728, and of 6 July 1979, p 1926). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1892, 12 Feb 82 p 390] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 11,464

CANADIAN COOPERATION AGREEMENT--A general cooperation agreement whose clauses have not been specified was concluded between Guinea and Canada at the close of a report signed on 6 February by Marc Perron, Canadian ambassador to Guinea, and Marcel Cros, Guinean minister of international cooperation. The report was signed following the visit by a delegation from the Canadian International Development Agency (ACDI) to Guinea. During its two-week stay, the ACDI mission took up the programming, by sector and subsector, of specific activities in order to draw up a cooperation program between the two countries. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1892, 12 Feb 82 p 390] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 11,464

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NEW MINISTRY OF DEVELOPMENT--A ministry charged with construction and national development has been established in Guinea, according to a communique from the Cabinet made public on 21 January. This new ministry replaces the Ministry of Public Works, whose abolition was decided on by the Cabinet in view of the inadequacy of the resources available to it in terms of the results achieved by the former ministry with its existing structure. The personnel as well as the material resources of the former Ministry of Public Works will be divided among the "Commissariats General of the Revolution (CGR, a kind of super prefecture in Guinea), which will then be responsible for the maintenance of the road networks and the maintenance of bridges and tunnels located in their respective territories. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1890, 29 Jan p 259] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982.] 5170

CONAKRY AIRPORT EXPANSION--The Aeroport de Paris Company has just signed a contract with the Government of the Republic of Guinea for a feasibility study covering the development and extension of Conakry airport. This feasibility study, in which the Aeroport de Paris Company will play the major role, will be carried out in association with SOFREAVIA [French Aviation Studies Company]. The study will cover the construction of a new passenger terminal, freight terminals and a maintenance hangar for the aircraft belonging to Air Guinea; the reconstruction and improvement of aeronautical support facilities; the installation of air navigation aids; the reconstruction and development of various buildings and road networks; and finally the organization and management of the airport serving the Guinean capital. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1890, 29 Jan 82 p 259] 5170 [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 5170

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GUINEA-BISSAU

BRIEFS

GRANT TO PORTUGUESE MAGAZINE--The Guinea-Bissau Government granted many thousands of dollars to a Portuguese magazine of the extreme right, TEMPO, for the publication of a supplement devoted to the "benefits" and "advantages" of the 14 November military coup d'etat. This unfortunate initiative, which was apparently due to the ministers of interior and information, created a considerable stir in Guinea public opinion and in international progressive circles. It was aimed at giving credence to the myth that the 14 November events were in the interest of the Guinea people. Worse, it appeared in a publication which is the customary mouthpiece of the leader of the UNITA, Savimbi. President Nino Vieira is reputedly planning to request an in-depth investigation of this affair. It is not excluded that it could end up by pointing out that it was aimed at reinforcing ties between Portuguese fascist circles and certain elements of the Guinea governmental teams. [Text] [Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 260, 1-14 Mar 82 p 31] [COPYRIGHT: 1982 Afrique-Asie]

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MOZAMBIQUE

GOVERNMENT SECRECY REPORTEDLY HAMPERS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1892, 12 Feb 82 p 413

[Text] In his wishes for Mozambique on the eve of the New Year, Samora Machel, chief of state, hoped that the initial success that will mark the actual launching of the decade-old fight against underdevelopment will be manifested and he issued an appeal to the nation for the success of the operation.

The opening to the outside needed in order to achieve such a result and the search for investments from Western countries encountered a major obstacle, the FINANCIAL TIMES recently emphasized: the excessive taste for secrecy on the part of the government. Naturally, we know that Mozambique must face acute economic problems, particularly regarding its negative balance of payments, adversely affected by the higher cost of energy and the need to import massive amounts of food because of the stagnation of agriculture resulting from the departure of Portuguese settlers after independence and from the drought and flooding.

However, "it is impossible to make a serious analysis of the economic situation in Mozambique," the British daily says. The only reliable data are in the hands of those close to the president of the republic and his ministers. Moreover, anyone seeking statistics is referred to the annual report drafted for the UN Security Council, a report most of whose figures the authors themselves say are not reliable.

This fanatic secrecy makes potential foreign investors reticent. In Great Britain, for example, the Export Credit's Guarantee Department (ECGD), which substantially corresponds to the French COFACE [French Foreign Trade Company], may refuse to cover the risks run by investors unless a certain number of data are available, particularly regarding the foreign debt and service on the debt in Mozambique. It is for this very reason that credits for an important aeronautics project were blocked by the United States' Eximbank.

Despite Maputo's absence from international organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, or its nonmembership in the Lome Convention, officials in the West have tried to evaluate Mozambique's economic difficulties. These attempts show that the overall balance of payments deficit is reportedly on the order of \$250 million, that foreign exchange reserves are evidently exhausted and that service of the debt is some \$500 to \$800 million.

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Assuming that these estimates are exact and considering Mozambique's need to ask for foreign assistance in order to fight its underdevelopment, the government would undoubtedly find it advantageous to be less secretive in order to obtain more.

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MOZAMBIQUE

BRIEFS

DEMANDS IN HOSTAGE CASE--John Burlison, a young British citizen, has been held hostage since 17 December of last year by the Mozambique National Resistance Movement (MRN) which is opposed to the present government in Maputo. The MRN has indicated that it will not release its hostage until the "world press" published a communique denouncing "the Maputo Marxist regime." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1891, 5 Feb 82 p 340] 8796

CASHEW NUT CROP--The cashew nut marketing campaign was scheduled to start at the end of January in the Mozambique Provinces of Sofala and Manica. Operations were delayed by 1 month due to the shortage of means of transportation. Machazem, Buri and Chibara are the main districts of these provinces where cashew nuts are grown. The 5,000-ton production target for this region is not likely to be met as a result of adverse climatic conditions and of insecurity. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1891, 5 Feb 82 p 340] 8796

AERIAL SURVEY--The photographic survey of the Mozambique national territory conducted in 1981 by the French Company of Stereoscopic Land Survey and by the National Directorate for Geology and Survey, better known under the initials of DINAGECA, has already covered more than 12,800 square kilometers. The maps drawn as part of this aerial survey program are on a scale of between 1/7,500 and 1/20,000 and represent several projects in progress in the country. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1891, 5 Feb p 340] 8796

COAL MINING AGREEMENTS--A bilateral agreement between Mozambique, Brazil and the OPEC Fund for International Development involving a mining project, a consortium of Brazilian companies will be entrusted with making an evaluation of reserves of coal in the Mucanha Vuza region and then will provide equipment and means of transportation for the mine. Studies will take 14 months to complete at a cost of \$5.4 million with \$2.3 million provided by the OPEC fund. By the time the project goes into operation, 6 or 7 years from now, total investments made will amount to \$700 million. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1891, 5 Feb 82 p 340] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 8796

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SERIOUS FOOD SHORTAGES--The Mozambican Government is planning to make an appeal to the international community for emergency food aid, according to a dispatch from the Portuguese agency ANOP dated Maputo, 2 February. According to the dispatch, which quotes diplomatic sources, the government in Maputo has reportedly already made contact with the ambassadors of the United States, Great Britain and Sweden in the Mozambican capital. According to the same sources, the food situation in the country is worse at the beginning of 1982 than it was in 1980, at the time of the great drought that made international aid necessary. The country reportedly covers only 5 percent of its meat and margarine needs and 10 percent of its needs for wheat and corn flour. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1892, 12 Feb 82 p 413] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 11,464

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NIGER

SAUDI AID TO DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS REVIEWED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1892, 12 Feb 82 p 393

[Text] On 1 February in Niamey, Nigerien Minister of Planning Brah Mamane joined with Muhammad Al-Sujayr, vice president of the Saudi Development Fund, in signing (as we briefly announced in MARCHES TROPICAUX, 5 February, p 323) two loan agreements for a total amount of 127 million Saudi rial, or the equivalent of 11 billion CFA francs, to be used for three road projects.

The first project involves the Niamey-Filingue road (71 million rial, or 6.1 billion CFA francs); the second, the Filingue-Tahoua road (2.6 billion CFA francs); and the third, the Margou-Gaya road (25.9 million Saudi rial, or 2.23 billion CFA francs). The Niamey-Balleyara-Filingue and Filingue-Tahoua projects represent a total of some 430 kilometers of roads, while the Margou-Falmey-Koulou-Gaya project in the southern part of the Department of Dosso represents some 180 kilometers.

Since 1976, total aid from the Saudi Development Fund has amounted to 12.52 billion CFA francs, with the Fund supplying 20.3 million rial in 1976 for construction of 150 homes (Faisal Compound), 19 silos for the Nigerien Foodstuffs Office (OPVN) and 31 grain silos. Other contributions of Saudi Arabia to Niger's development for 1976, 1978 and 1979 amount to 7,727,000,000 CFA francs.

Kandadji: Future Saudi Participation

In addition, Saudi Arabia is studying participation in the financing of the Kandadji Dam, Muhammad Al-Sujayr, vice president of the Saudi Development Fund, said on 2 February.

Following a meeting with Col Seyni Kountche, Al-Sujayr said that he had flown over the site picked for construction of the dam and had "discussed financing of the project with the chief of state."

The dam, which should be built some 170 kilometers above Niamey on the Niger, would, according to authorities, make it possible to irrigate 110,000 hectares of arable land, supply the region's water needs and install a 125-megawatt hydroelectric powerplant. For the first phase of work, the cost is an estimated 100 billion CFA francs.

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NIGER

BRIEFS

MALIAN FRONTIER TALKS--The Malian minister of interior and urban affairs, Lt Col Sory Ibrahima Sylla, and the Nigerian secretary of state for the interior, Amadou Fity Maiga, after 2 days of discussions in Niamey, reached an agreement on 28 January by which the frontier authorities of the two countries will meet regularly to resolve border questions. In a communique the two ministers also recommended the holding of a meeting between ministers of the two countries charged with finance and commerce "to examine questions on the transit of cattle and of merchandise." The suggestion for holding the meeting on transit issues was made by the Malian side. The two ministers also proposed the establishment of a "joint, mixed commission for a reconnaissance of the border for later use." Mali and Niger have a common border about 800 km long in the grasslands and Sahara regions. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1891, 5 Feb 82 p 323] 5170

ROAD CONSTRUCTION--The director general of the Jean Lefebvre Company from Ivory Coast, Alain Dewe, was received on 27 January by Nigerian chief of state, Col Seyni Kountche. Dewe indicated that the conversation concerned the construction of the section of road from Zinder to Mirriah to Diffa and the section of road from Tchadoua to Guidan to Roumdji to Maradi which has been assigned to his company. "We count on working in collaboration with certain Nigerian companies, particularly the Ali Soumana Reinforced Concrete Company. The necessary equipment will be on hand in the near future, and the work will begin between now and mid-February. The cost of the construction is estimated at 3.5 billion CFA [African Financial Community] francs. Dewe went on to say, "Elsewhere we had occasion to mention the development of the road network in Niger and in the Nigerian border area. On this subject we expressed the wish that we might see construction programs leading to the establishment of a Nigerian road construction company able to respond to the needs of the government in terms of road maintenance and construction of small road projects." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1891, 5 Feb 82 p 323] 5170

PEANUT PRODUCTION--In our issue No 1888 of 15 January (p 140) we published a note on the situation in Niger in which we gave the figure of 1,567 tons as the production of peanuts in the 1980-81 season. As indicated to us by Ali Sabo, director general of SONARA (Nigerian Company for the Sale of Peanuts), "this figure is rather that for the sale of shelled peanuts for the season in question. The production figure for that year was 126,125 tons." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1891, 5 Feb 82 p 323] 5170

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SAUDI ROAD CONSTRUCTION LOANS--Two loan agreements amounting to 11 billion CFA francs altogether were signed in Niamey on 1 February. These two loans, provided by Saudi Arabia, are intended to finance two road projects: the construction of the road from Niamey to Filingue to Tahoua (about 430 km) and the road from Margou to Falmey to Gaya, in the southern part of Dosso Department (about 180 km). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1891, 5 Feb 82 p 323] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982.] 5170

FRENCH AID IN 1981--The total amount of French civilian aid to Niger in 1981 was 23.44 billion CFA francs, according to an initial estimate drawn up by French economic sources in Niamey. Out of this total, loans from the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation (CCCE) amounted to 13.75 billion CFA francs. In addition, according to an initial balance sheet from the French Aid and Cooperation mission, aid to investments (Aid and Cooperation Fund, FAC) amounted to 2.42 billion, technical assistance totaled an estimated 5.2 billion and training scholarships 228 million, plus 60 million in expenses of the Ministry of National Education. Finally, financial aid in the form of loan allowances from the CCCE amounted to 1.75 billion CFA francs. Added together, the aid places France in first place among those giving civilian assistance to Niger, with 26 percent of the total in 1981. During the 5 previous years (1976-1980), France was Niger's main backer, with 27 percent of the total civilian aid, leading the European Development Fund (14 percent), the World Bank (12 percent) and the Federal Republic of Germany (9 percent). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1892, 12 Feb 82 p 393] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 11,464

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NIGERIA

NIGERIAN'S ARTICLE ON TRADE APPEARS IN MOSCOW PUBLICATION

Moscow FOREIGN TRADE in English No 2, Feb 82 pp 31-32

[Article by S. C. Theonunekwu, Trade representative of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in the USSR: "Development of Trade Between Nigeria and the USSR"]

[Text] Before attainment of political independence no direct commercial transactions were conducted between Nigeria and the Soviet Union. Nigerian products appeared in the Soviet Union only through the commercial transactions of British firms. Our commercial links therefore must be said to be a relatively new phenomenon, starting with Nigeria's political independence in 1960.

With the establishment of diplomatic relations, direct commercial contacts began, which received added impetus when in June 1961 the Federal Minister for Finance, Chief Festus S. Okotie-Eboh, led a Nigerian delegation to Moscow to conduct negotiations on direct trade between Nigeria and the Soviet Union.

These negotiations initiated a series of official contacts between Lagos and Moscow which culminated in the drawing up of a trade agreement between our countries. Another big event concerning trade with the Soviet Union was the visit of the former Federal Minister for Commerce and Industry, Aljaji Zana Bukar Dipcharima, who, on behalf of

the Nigerian government, signed in Moscow the first trade agreement between Nigeria and the USSR in July 1963.

Experience gained while implementing the first trade agreement gave rise to the conclusion of others, each subsequently coming into effect.

Nigeria's main export items to the Soviet Union during the 1965-1975 period included cocoa beans, cocoa oil, arabic gum and varieties of tropical wood. With the exception of cocoa beans and cocoa oil other items have gradually faded from the Nigerian export list to the USSR.

Featuring principally on the latest Soviet export list to Nigeria are pig iron, steel, rolled stock factories' equipment, pipes, motor vehicles, agricultural machinery, frozen fish, building materials.

Noteworthy during the decade 1965-1975 Nigeria enjoyed a favourable balance of trade, except in 1966, when it suffered a small trade deficit. Trade turnover reached its maximum in 1975 and amounted to 108.3 million rubles. Since 1977 the trade

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balance with the Soviet Union has become negative. Thus, for instance, in 1980 out of total turnover between our countries which amounted to 99.6 million rubles, Soviet exports to Nigeria accounted for 80.2 million rubles, while Nigerian export to the USSR amounted only to 19.4 million rubles. The growth of Soviet exports to Nigeria was due to the increasing deliveries to Nigeria of machinery and manufacturing equipment for projects built with Soviet assistance.

Certain factors exerted a restraining influence on the evolution of commercial links between the two countries. One of them - inadequate information about potential possibilities of our countries. Another influential factor to be considered in determining the flow of trade between the two partners is their different social and economic structures. In the USSR, foreign trade is a state monopoly whereas Nigeria practises a market economic system. Under the circumstances the interplay of external, political and economic forces which often cause complications when planning foreign trade have to be taken into account. Development of trade between the two states was further challenged by their geographical remoteness. To a great extent the trade is affected by intensity, stability and by the traditional trade and economic relations. With the passage of time, West African countries, including Nigeria, have come within commercial reach of the Soviet

Union.

The volume of commercial transactions between our two countries has constantly increased, rising from a more or less insignificant sum of about eight million rubles in 1965 to 99.6 million rubles in 1980 (a 12-fold increase).

Careful examination of the pattern of trade between the two countries reveals that so far raw materials dominate in Nigerian exports to the USSR in exchange for Soviet finished industrial products. At the same time the potentialities of the two export markets have not yet been fully realized. Perhaps as of now closer intergovernmental contacts are required to alert each country of their economic and commercial possibilities and potentialities.

In an economic agreement which the two countries signed in 1976 the USSR agreed to build a gigantic iron and steel plant in Nigeria. Work on this project began in June last year and it is regarded as the basis of Nigeria's future industrial and economic progress. There is no doubt that the day when steel starts rolling off the production lines of this plant, a new era of economic development will open for Nigeria.

The 1970s have passed and the 1980s are with us, these days we can expect Nigeria to further develop her national industries as they will positively influence the volume and structure of its foreign trade.

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NIGERIA

RELATIONS WITH CAMEROON REVIEWED

President's Visit

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1889, 22 Jan 82 p 201

[Text] The recent visit to Nigeria by President Ahidjo of Cameroon turned out to be very satisfactory for both countries.

In fact, as stated in a joint communique published at the end of this trip, "President Ahidjo's visit enabled the two leaders to restore an atmosphere of trust, peace and mutual understanding."

The communique also notes that a trade agreement was signed alongside with an agreement on administrative cooperation in the sphere of customs, a cooperation agreement on telecommunications, an extradition treaty and a draft treaty dealing with postal and financial services.

The communique also mentions that both heads of state have decided to reactivate the joint commission and to study the possibilities of bilateral cooperation in the sphere of hydroelectric power.

On an international level, President Ahidjo and President Shagari reaffirmed their identity of views on major current problems in Africa and agreed to support the OAU's efforts in Chad and elsewhere.

Agreement To Be Conducted

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1889, 22 Jan 82 p 201

[Text] President Ahidjo's visit to Nigeria was given extensive coverage in the press of both countries. In its issue of 10-11 January, the daily CAMEROON TRIBUNE recalls the bonds which have united these two countries since their independence and the agreements concluded or due to be concluded.

These bonds led to the establishment of diplomatic relations as soon as independence was proclaimed and to many official visits from both sides under the various Nigerian regimes. They also led to exchanges of workers in large numbers--with many Cameroonians going to Nigeria and some 50,000 Nigerians coming to Cameroon--to a diversified trade and to several agreements, namely:

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Agreements signed, ratified and still in force:

Friendship and cooperation treaty (6 February 1963 in Yaounde)

Draft treaty on the control of movements of people and goods (6 February 1963 in Yaounde)

Agreement on airline operations by virtue of which Nigeria Airways has been landing in Douala and Cam-Air in Lagos since November 1971

Cultural cooperation agreement (27 March 1972 in Lagos)

Draft treaty on police matters (27 March 1972 in Lagos)

Agreements negotiated but not signed:

Commercial agreement (1972)

Extradition treaty (1972)

Draft treaty dealing with fishing in territorial waters (1972)

Agreements due to be negotiated or renewed:

Draft treaty on the exchange of postal orders

Agreement dealing with telecommunications

Convention on setting up joint border checkpoints

Convention on postal settlements and tariffs

Additional protocol to the trade agreement on the location of palm groves at the border between Nigeria and Cameroon

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NIGERIA

BRIEFS

OFFSHORE OIL DISCOVERIES--In January, the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) announced the discovery of a new offshore deposit, designated Mfoniso-1, in its No 97 Concession, located in the state of Riveres. The drilling to 38 meters below sea level began last 17 November, and the positive results achieved in December were confirmed subsequently. The initial potential is for the exploitation of 3,000 barrels per day. Other wells will be drilled during the third quarter of the year to establish the extent of the deposit. The discovery announced in January is the ninth marketable deposit found offshore by the NNPC since its drilling activities began in 1976. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1893, 19 Feb 82 p 563] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreaux et Cie Paris [1982]] 5157

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SENEGAMBIA

ESTIMATED HARVESTS OF VARIOUS CROPS NOTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1886, 1 Jan 82 p 23

[Text] During the 1981-1982 agricultural year, the two major cash crops of Senegal, peanuts and cotton, are expected to produce 800,000 tons and 33,000 tons respectively (compared to 500,000 tons and 22,000 tons in 1980) as we reported in an earlier article (see MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS issue of 25 December 1981 p 3426).

As for other farm products, estimated figures supplied by Director General of Agricultural Production Coly indicate that, this year, Senegal will produce over 700,000 tons of millet and sorghum. If so, this year's crop will be the third highest since independence.

The two best years produced crops of about 800,000 tons. The lowest figures ever registered were in the neighborhood of 300,000 tons. In the 1981-1982 farming season, farmers planted the highest acreage of millet in 20 years. More than 1 million hectares of millet and sorghum were planted. Three-fifths of the millet crop will be grown in the Sine-Saloum region.

With an average yield of 700 kilos per hectare, the 1981-1982 crop year is the second best since independence. Only the 1978-1979 farming season was better with a national average of around 800 kilos per hectare. In the last decades, the average yield for millet crops has been slightly over 550 kilos per hectare and the lowest 300 kilos per hectare.

Another grain crop which had good results was the corn crop with a total production of over 50,000 tons and an average yield of 800 kilos per hectare. The 1981-1982 crop was 2,000 tons higher than last year. Even better results could have been achieved if fertilizers had been applied at the right time and in sufficient quantities.

This year, Senegal's rice paddy production--grown by various methods--was just above 100,000 tons, not enough to meet half of the country's needs which stands at around 240,000 tons.

Finally, the bean crop fell to 26,000 tons (compared to 35,000 tons for the previous farming season) although more acreage was planted (59,000 hectares).

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According to the Dakar daily LE SOLEIL, the amount of rain which fell during the 1981-1982 winter season was "within the crops requirements. The first widespread rains started on 25 June (except in the Louga region where they came a month later). Despite brief periods without rain in the northern and central regions, the amount of rain did not cause any major setback.

"Contrary to what was feared at the beginning, the slight time difference in the rainfall between the northern zone and the rest of the country did not have adverse effects, because in some areas it stopped raining in September but there were rains in October. The combined effect of these two factors was that plants with pods likely to be exposed to a second germination had a chance to dry up while the October rains ensured the vegetative cycle of the late crops in the north.

"Finally, in contrast with what happened during the previous farming year, the sowing did not stop when rains were forecast. By 31 July, 90 percent of all the sowing had been completed."

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SENEGAMBIA

BRIEFS

RICE PRICE INCREASE--There has been a 30 percent increase in the price of a kilogram of rice in Senegal, which has gone up from 80 to 105 CFA [African Financial Community] francs, effective 31 January. In announcing this decision, Falilou Kane, Senegalese minister of commerce, emphasized that this measure was aimed in particular at lightening the financial burdens of Senegal, by encouraging the citizens to consume Senegalese products, in order to bring an end to the shortages of certain food items and to fight against fraudulent export of rice (imported by Senegal) to neighboring countries. The Senegalese minister stated that Senegal subsidized rice to the extent of 4 billion CFA francs in 1981 and imported 450,000 tons of rice, as compared to 250,000 tons imported in 1974. Minister Kane also indicated that Senegal is already subsidizing certain products (peanut oil, cotton, sugar, wheat) and most recently peanuts, following the noticeable decline in the price of these commodities on the world market. He noted in particular that the Senegalese Government this year has spent 10.5 billion CFA francs to maintain the price of peanuts from this year's crop of 750,000 tons. Minister Kane said that the Senegalese Government, by deciding to raise the price of rice, chose instead to subsidize peanuts with the intention of maintaining the purchasing power of the farmers at their previously determined remunerative level. The increase in the prices to the producers of agricultural products is one of the two principal measures taken this year by the president of Senegal. The other decision is the absorption of the debt owed by farmers to rural assistance organizations (20 billion CFA francs). Finally, Falilou Kane indicated that the millet harvest is good this year, amounting to 750,000 tons. He also called on the Senegalese people to consume more millet, both in the countryside as well as in the cities. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1891, 5 Feb 82 p 317] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982.] 5170

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TOGO

BRIEFS

DEBT RESCHEDULING--The Togolese chief of state, Gen Gnassingbe Eyadema, returned to Lome on 13 February following official visits to the FRG and Libya (see MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 12 February 1982, page 394). Two agreements pertaining to the rescheduling of the Togolese debt to the FRG were signed in Bonn on 11 February. They provide for the extension over 9 years of the payment period for the 34 million deutschmarks (88 million French francs) in debts payable originally between 1 January 1981 and 31 December 1982. They are the result of medium and long-term credit granted to Lome by Bonn and commercial credit granted by West German banks to Togo with the financial guarantee of the government of the FRG. Both documents were based on the rescheduling protocol (deferred repayment) signed a year ago, on 20 February 1981, in Paris, between Togo and its main creditors (in this connection see MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEES, 27 February 1981, page 488). Prior to the signing, President Eyadema met with Rainer Offergeld, the FRG minister for economic cooperation, who gave Bonn's agreement in principle to joint contribution, along with other countries, to the construction of the dam which Togo wants to build with Benin on the Mono River on the frontier. President Eyadema and Minister Offergeld stressed the importance of economic cooperation between the FRG and Togo. The expansion of the Lome port carried out with FRG aid, they said, made it possible to improve the procedures for supplying Togo as well as that country's exports. They also stressed the effectiveness of West German aid in the world development of Togo, which has contributed to the improvement of its food situation. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1893, 19 Feb 82 p 562] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreaux et Cie Paris [1982]] 5157

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UGANDA

CLASHES REPORTEDLY LEAVE 90 DEAD NEAR KAMPALA

JN261320 London REUTERS in English 1220 GMT 26 Feb 82

[Report by Bearnd Debusmann]

[Text] Nairobi, 26 Feb (REUTER)--About 90 people have been killed during army search operations following the mortaring of Kampala's main barracks by anti-government guerrillas on Tuesday, medical sources reported from the Ugandan capital today. Contacted by telephone from Nairobi, the sources said many of those killed were found in Namanve Forest which gained gruesome notoriety as a dumping ground for corpses during the murderous 8-year reign of dictator Idi Amin.

"With very few exceptions, those found in the forest had bullet holes in the back of the neck," one source reported. He declined to be named and would not say how many of the dead were civilians.

Other Kampala residents have also spoken of excesses by the army in their search and one Ugandan professional working for a state-run organisation alleged to REUTERS that there had been killings, raping and looting.

On Tuesday, some 300 heavily-armed guerrillas slipped into Kampala, set up mortar positions around Lubiri barracks near army headquarters, and lobbed mortar shells into the sprawling compound below. The government said 67 attackers and two soldiers died in the subsequent fighting.

Members of the diplomatic corps in Kampala were taken on a tour of the barracks today and said there was little damage to the complex, surrounded by an 8-foot (2.5-metre) wall. The diplomats were also taken to Rubaga Cathedral, perched on a hill overlooking the barracks, and shown a mortar position the attackers set up on the steps of the twin-towered building.

The Ugandan official accompanying the diplomats, Capt John Upor, a member of Parliament, said the army had fired back with recoilless rifles after the mortar attack, beating back the guerrillas.

Third World diplomats in Kampala described the raid, the biggest since organised anti-government operations began a year ago, as an acute political embarrassment for the government of Dr Milton Obote. His administration has

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consistently dismissed anti-government forces as mere bandits and terrorists, totally without popular support.

The Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM), which claimed responsibility for the attack, has said the fact that such a large group of men could operate freely enough to shell the main barracks proved that it had local backing. The guerrillas melted into the lush countryside after the raid and dispersed towards the former capital of Entebbe on the shore of Lake Victoria.

Although life in Kampala swiftly returned to normal after the fighting, with shops and government offices operating as usual, Third World diplomats described the attack as a major setback to efforts to rebuild a country shattered by Amin's misrule and the bloody campaign to oust him.

The diplomats said the guerrilla operation was also likely to have an adverse effect on efforts to make a disciplined, professional army out of what they called "the gunmen in uniform" who helped overthrow Amin.

Much of the violence which has shaken Uganda since his departure has been ascribed to the army and security forces.

Leaders of the opposition Democratic Party have said the army tends to over-react to guerrilla operations, often resorting to indiscriminate reprisals.

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UGANDA

FIRST-HAND ACCOUNT DESCRIBES KARAMOJA SITUATION

Paris PROJET in French Jan 82 pp 111-115

[Article by Jacqueline d'Harcourt: "Six Months in Uganda"]

[Text] During the summer of 1980, a French television report revealed that a terrible famine existed in Karamoja, a province in northwest Uganda. Gifts flowed in, enabling a few non-government organizations to send in emergency aid teams. I went for 6 months with the AICF (International Action Against Hunger) to distribute food and set up some little development projects.

These are my personal impressions on what expatriates, "Musumbu," as the Karamojongs call them, are apt to feel and achieve by living among a people affected by famine.

The Karamojongs are semi-nomadic herdsmen: the men go away in the dry season to pasture the herds, the women, children, and old men stay behind in the village. This "primitive" population is unfamiliar with the wheel, has no written language, lights fires with flints, and does not use cattle for ploughing. The Karamojongs have always lived on the fringes of Ugandan life, forgotten on their high plateau, despised by the other tribes. Their resources are very limited: the herd supplies milk and blood to feed them, pelts to clothe them; the men do a little hunting for big wild game (zebra, giraffe, antelope), the women use hoes to scratch at the earth around the villages to grow, with luck, some sorghum.

Karamoja's economy depends on a fragile ecological balance among the land (dry savannah), the livestock, and human beings. But for several years the balance has been broken: the English made considerable inroads upon the herds, and the populations has doubled since independence as a result of the introduction of medicine. The herd can no longer be used as currency for trade, it is no longer sufficient to feed the population, and is becoming the subject of increasing struggles among Karamojongs. Trade has fallen off since the political unrest has made travel dangerous. When Amin fell, the military barracks were pillaged and all the arms stolen. Karamojongs have a lot of trouble leaving their territory. If they go into hospital in

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another province, they run the risk of being killed in their beds or not being treated.

After 2 consecutive years of drought (1978-1979), the situation became catastrophic. With no links to the rest of the country, no harvests, no seeds to sow, and the livestock decimated, the Karamojongs were doomed to decline and slow death unless outside aid came quickly. But in such a context of deterioration of the living environment, there was no real solution to the famine, and outside help was to create upheaval in the already unsettled Karamojong society.

The Karamojongs' reaction to hunger is something unimaginable for our society of plenty. When a person has seen his relatives die of hunger, and when he has been hungry enough to scabble in the soil to dig out roots, to eat dirt by the handful, behaviors undergo profound and long-lasting modifications and become very hard for Europeans to understand.

The Karamojongs assure the survival of the group above all else: they do not touch the livestock, sole source of riches. The herd is the heritage that brings power, and in that sense it is sacred. The Karamojongs would rather die than kill their cows, for without cows, they would soon be doomed: no milk to feed the men, bridge the gap between harvests, give a little protection from the chanciness of the climate. Men are fed in priority, then the boys, their successors, and young women able to work and have children. The old men are the first to be abandoned, then the young children. When they get beyond a certain level of malnutrition, the children are rejected by their families. In the "feeding centers," it was not unusual for mothers to steal their children's food to give it to their husbands. Certain children, restored to health and sent back to their villages, would come back again in a month in an appalling state: they were already dead so far as concerned their families, who were no longer feeding them. While they are not the rule, such behaviors are frequent and fit in with the economy of the group.

Starvation contributes to the creation of attitudes toward food that were surprising to us at first; as soon as it is distributed, the corn is eaten or turned into beer. Why make beer when the quantity distributed is only just enough to barely meet needs? The answer is quite a simple one: first the beer will be sold, and with the money he gets, the brewer can buy more corn on the local black market than was given to him, and then, the Karamojongs drink beer because they prefer an instant, intense pleasure to a long series of privations. It is not crazy, it is one way of exorcizing the fear of dying, an understandable form of "carpe diem" /"gather the day"; live while you can⁷. At the height of the famine in 1979, an agronomist managed to get some seed and find some surplus seed suitable for dry savannah, something of a feat; he distributed it to the populace; a few days later, he found out that a large part of the seed had immediately been made into beer. That is obviously hard to take.

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Finally, the massive contricution of food from WFP (World Food Program) from May 1980 onward resulted in great deterioration in Karamojong Society. The food became a right. And painful scenes were witnessed of angry women and old men howling for "poscho" (cornmeal); in Moroto, the main city of Karamoja, there were demonstrations of fury when trucks full of corn drove through the city without stopping. Not only did the Karamojongs lose every shred of dignity, at the same time they became vagrants, stopped working, waited for the distributions. These are the ill effects of aid; they are inevitable and will persist so long as the expatriates are there and the distributions continue. But there is no alternative; in 1979, the WFP turned over the food stocks to the Ugandan government, and 90 percent have been misappropriated.

As we work, we have this question ever present in our minds: how can aid be prevented from turning into support? We tried to find, or more precisely groped toward, an answer, for there is no really satisfactory solution. We had a few possible procedures: sell the corn, the tools, to make it clear that they were not gifts nor rights, but an exchange. But fresh problems emerged: sell, yes, but at what price? if it was too low, we ran the risk of smuggling with neighboring areas; too high, and hardly anybody could buy any more.

"Food for work," the second method: exchange food for work. Repair roads, dig water reservoirs, build schools. Each village takes on a project that it completes, we check and distribute afterwards. A difficult task: the Karamojongs cannot see any advantage in repairing trails, building schools. They hope to get the food without work. Then you have to insist and threaten to get certain indispensable work restarted (such as digging the reservoirs) after it had been dropped when the famine came.

But handouts in whatever form provide temporary improvement, not solutions. The famine is the result of such an accumulation of phenomena that sustained action must be taken for the Karamojongs to be able to recover an acceptable state of self-sufficiency.

With this in mind, we tried to diversify resources, using techniques suited to the local situation, like weaving, cart-building, wicker-work, pottery. These simple techniques use materials found locally or in nearby areas, and permit manufacture of useful items. We trained a few people who in turn train others. The workshops are organized into cooperatives intended to work autonomously.

These projects are engaging, but it is also very hard to make them work. One success for every 10 failures. They have to offer immediate advantages so that the Karamojongs can see the results of their work quickly; they must not upset the social organization. The weaving shop is a good example: we used rudimentary looms and manufactured lengths of cotton cloth. Cloth is extremely hard to find in Karamoja, and there we are finding a way to get a fine piece of material in 3 days! The cotton mill is open only to the men, so that weaving will become a noble, prestigious activity, and will

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not be dropped at the first difficulty. In spite of all that, the expatriates have to be there all the time to make sure that operations go well, whereas for the outcome of these efforts to be successful, they should be taken over by the Karamojongs. What is to be done to get these warriors to develop without losing their identity? Is it right to start these workshops? What would be the most suitable projects?

We measure the chasm between the Karamojongs and ourselves; it is the cause of the problems, but enriches us at the same time.

In Uganda, we Europeans undergo the threefold experience of power, difference, and another way of life. "Landing" in Karamoja with "full authority" (control of the food), we feel as if we have the power of life and death over a population that would do anything to have something to eat.

But one should make no mistake about this, and missionaries who have lived here for a long time are well aware of it: whatever our power may be, we are not the chiefs. Acknowledged, respected, feared perhaps, above all we are intruders to be taken advantage of to the maximum. In the best of cases we are looked upon as guests. In meetings with the villagers, the chiefs keep to themselves, not wanting to be compromised in transactions with the "poscho merchants." We think we are in control of the situation, but in fact many reactions and many decisions escape us. We realize much later what really happened.

The situation makes many demands on us. You have to keep your temper, have a sense of humor, know exactly what you want, and what you can gain, and be sure of yourself. There can be no trickery during palavers; the Karamojongs soon perceive what sort of person they are dealing with, and they are pitiless. You have to learn what your power is and how far it goes, and that takes wisdom enough to admit it and strength enough never to get discouraged.

Yet life is far simpler for Europeans "over there" than it is here. Having nothing to fall back on, we have only ourselves to depend on, and we very quickly learn to behave with economy: waste nothing, assess, plan ahead. Trips to Kenya are few and far between (every 3 weeks) and long (a two-day round-trip); one cannot be careless. The vehicles must be maintained, and it is sometimes hard to be meticulous when one is very tired. The Karamojongs teach us to make use of anything: our discards supply their extras. Our meager garbage cans are besieged: capsules are used as ornaments, food cans become cooking pots, potato peelings are devoured.

All day long, we are watched, observed, there is no privacy, nothing is a secret. You can never have a moment's peace, someone is always coming to complain. You have to be attentive to everything. We also learn the rules of courtesy all over again, too: respect the customs, bow, smile, and always be dignified.

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When practical problems take on so much importance and make up the framework of everyday life, when you have to be careful to stay alive, the difference between what is essential and what is superfluous becomes very clear. Life seems simpler. Is that what gives the expatriates who have lived over there a long time the untroubled gaze of people in harmony with themselves?

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UPPER VOLTA

BRIEFS

NEW LABOR REGULATIONS--The prohibition on the right to strike in effect since last 1 November (see MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 6 November 81 page 2822) in Upper Volta was lifted on 14 February by order of Col Saye Zerbo, president of the Military Committee for Recovery for National Progress (CMRPN) and chief of state. In addition, the presidential order set forth the procedures for settling collective labor disputes. If the provisions of this regulation are approved by the trade unions in Upper Volta, the CMRPN will have taken an important step along its long and difficult path toward providing the country with the social contract announced when Col Saye Zerbo assumed power in November 1980. In addition, the regulation, which stresses that the right to strike "can only be exercised in connection with the defense of legitimate collective interests," lists the state departments and bodies which are not authorized to participate in strikes. This applies to the judges, secretaries general and directors general of public and parapublic departments, the army, the police, penal institutions and customs authorities, among others. Finally, the regulation specifies that any trade union organization which calls an illegal strike or continues such despite a court order can be dissolved. [Excerpt] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1893, 19 Feb 82, p 561] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreaux et Cie Paris [1982]] 5157

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ZAIRE

DIAMOND CUTTING INDUSTRY ENVISAGED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1890, 29 Jan 82 p 269

[Text] Zaire which is the world's largest diamond producer--a fact often forgotten--plans to set up a cutting industry for these precious stones. The project is said to have received technical backing from three independent companies which took over the marketing of Zairian diamonds last year, after Zaire cancelled the contract giving exclusive marketing rights to the Central Selling Organization of the De Beers group. These companies (the London-based Industrial Diamond Company and the Antwerp-based Caddi and Glasol) are reported to be cooperating in the project with the Zairian state company SOZACOM [Zairian Company for the Marketing of Ores] which has a monopoly over the marketing of mineral ores in Zaire. The proposed cutting plant will require investments of about \$2 million and will provide, or so the government hopes, jobs for 700 Zairians.

According to the FINANCIAL TIMES, this information was made public in Kinshasa at the end of the latest diamond sales involving 441,900 karats (the November 1981 production of mostly industrial diamonds mined by MIBA [Bakwanga Mining Company] and of jewelry diamonds from Tshikapa). The proceeds from this sale amounted to some \$8.5 million, of which \$5 million was in hard currencies, with jewelry diamonds fetching an average price of \$179.4 per karat. Lower grade industrial diamonds (bort) were also sold at \$2.2 per karat, a price considered to be satisfactory by SOZACOM since that type of diamonds is sold at markedly lower prices in Antwerp.

The financial daily of the city mentions that Zaire's diamond industry faces two major problems: the illegal mining and marketing of diamonds in quantities practically equal to the official production, and the declining quality of the stones extracted from the mine operated by MIBA (Bakwanga Mining Company). Furthermore, the country's total (official) production is falling partly as a result of illegal sales: Zaire's production, which reached a record high of 13.4 million karats in 1974, was only 5.7 million karats in 1981 and is expected to amount to 6 million karats in 1982.

Alluvial deposits are being worked out and it is becoming urgent to start a program of extraction from underground mines. The MIBA people estimate that exploited deposits of kimberlite contain reserves of some 150 million karats. But funds must be found to finance this project. According to SOZACOM

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estimates, \$40 million of foreign loans will be required which, in practice, will have to come from the World Bank group. In fact, representatives of the International Finance Corporation (SFI), a World Bank subsidiary, were due in Kinshasa at the end of January.

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ZAIRE

BRIEFS

INGA II PROGRESS--The second phase of the Inga hydroelectric complex, Inga II, intended to supply electricity for the Shaba mining region which is located 1,820 kms away, will go into operation in July 1982. According to Zaire Presse Agency, [AZAP], which quotes official statements issued by the Ministry of Industry, tests to carry high voltage currents to the Shaba region will start in January and last 6 months. The Inga II power plant has a generating capacity of 1,272 megawatts and will boost to 2,324 megawatts the installed capacity of Zaire's hydroelectric power plants. The high voltage power line linking the Shaba mining region to the power plant is the longest in the world. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1890, 29 Jan 82 p 269] 8796

STATE ENTERPRISES REVERSION--The question of putting some Zairian public enterprises back into private ownership remains on the agenda. The Executive Council devoted special attention to this question last December and a statement issued by the state commissioner for government investment holdings on proposed conditions for the transfer or purchase of these enterprises has provided some details. The conditions which individual or corporate entities must fulfill to be accepted into an enterprise created to replace a dissolved public enterprise are: (1) They must uphold and continue the original social purpose of the enterprise being turned over to private ownership; (2) They must have the required management experience and ability in the sector concerned or in a sector of activities related to those carried out by the enterprise being transferred to private ownership; (3) They must offer solid financial guarantees; (4) They must be in order with the internal revenue office and with social agencies. These conditions apply to all individuals or corporate entities under Zairian law which wish to become owners of an enterprise being turned over to private ownership through purchase. The council has asked state commissioners to send to the Department of Government Investment Holdings as soon as they can list enterprises from their respective sectors which are eligible for transfer to private ownership. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1890, 29 Jan 82 p 269] 8796

NEW WATER SUPPLY PROGRAMS--As part of the 1981-90 water and drainage international decade, the REGIDESO [Water and Power Distribution Administration] has prepared preliminary plan for the supply of drinking water, intended to bring water to 144 locations throughout the country where that service is

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still unavailable. The cost of implementing this program has been estimated at over \$232 million. In addition to creating more jobs, the program also aims at making drinking water available all over the country and ensuring that this service reaches at least 70 percent of the population by 1985 and 85 percent by 1990. The number of locations set by the program is divided as follows: 6 in Lower Zaire, 19 in Equateur, 17 in Shaba, 15 in Eastern Kasai, 11 in Western Kasai, 21 in Kivu, 24 in Bandundu, 31 in Upper Zaire. The city of Kinshasa is not included in the safe water supply program but appears in an expansion program involving drinking water purification and distribution installations spread over the same decade. These two programs, and another one to train technical and administrative management personnel, represent REGIDESO's 10-year program covering the 1981-90 period. Although this is only a preliminary plan, it gives a good idea of what efforts the Zairian agency intends to make during the current decade. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1890, 29 Jan 82 p 269] 8796

FRENCH MILITARY AID--According to Gen Francois Gilard, head of the military cooperation section in the French Ministry of Cooperation and Development, France is willing to increase its financial aid to Zaire in the framework of its military assistance. General Gilard, who arrived in Zaire on 12 January for an inspection visit of Zairian military units where French overseas volunteers are working, was received by the Zairian head of state, Gen Mobutu Sese Seko, on 16 January. After this audience, General Gilard expressed satisfaction with the spirit of cooperation which exists between the Zairian officers and the French overseas volunteers. According to official sources, there are 128 officers and NCO's serving as French military overseas volunteers in the Zairian Armed Forces. Their main tasks are to train paratroopers, to supervise an air unit equipped with Mirage planes, a tank brigade and the Zairian Armed Forces Training School of Mbanza-Ngungu in the Lower Zaire Region. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1889, 22 Jan 82 p 207] 8796

ITALIAN AID FOR REFUGEES--The Italian Government has pledged to help Ugandan refugees in Zaire by placing 10 million lire (approximately \$80,000) at the disposal of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR]. According to a communique issued by the Zairian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, this sum is intended to cover the deficit of the UNHCR's aid program for Ugandan refugees in Zaire. Close to 160,000 Ugandan refugees are currently residing in Zaire, a country hosting 600,000 refugees with the largest group being some 245,000 Angolans. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1891, 5 Feb 82 p 331] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982.] 8796

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